I recently gave a talk suggesting that Henry VIII’s decision to change England’s usury laws had consequences that reached far beyond his lifetime.
At the time, I was fairly confident about the argument. For centuries, charging interest on loans had been regarded as a serious moral wrong. Then, in 1545, Henry’s Parliament permitted lending at interest within a prescribed limit. It seemed to me that an important restriction had been weakened, helping set us on the path toward the debt-dependent financial system we know today.
But recently, as I’ve been revisiting the history of money and the rules that govern it, I’ve begun to wonder whether that explanation was too simple.
In my previous newsletter, I discovered that medieval objections to usury were considerably more sophisticated than I had appreciated. Thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas were not merely opposed to commerce. They asked difficult questions about fairness, the nature of money, and whether it was right to profit from another person’s need.
My experience borrowing to establish a dental practice taught me how difficult those questions could be. A loan at 11% interest in 2007 let me build a business, yet when the financial crisis arrived, that same debt became a source of enormous vulnerability.
So I went back to Henry VIII, expecting to find the moment when a moral prohibition had been set aside. Instead, I found a king struggling to escape Rome’s authority, merchants challenging trade restrictions, and a government so desperate for money that it began changing the silver content of England’s coins.
And in the middle of it all was a law that permitted something it still described as unlawful.
That was not quite the story I remembered.
A King's Problem Becomes a Nation's Problem
By the late 1520s, Henry had been married to Catherine of Aragon for nearly twenty years. Although she had borne several children, only their daughter Mary had survived to adulthood. Henry desperately wanted a male heir, and he became convinced that his marriage was contrary to God’s law because Catherine had previously married his brother Arthur.
Whether that conviction was sincere, a convenient justification for his ambitions, or some combination of the two remains a matter of debate. What is certain is that Henry wanted his marriage annulled and wished to marry Anne Boleyn, but the Pope would not grant the annulment he sought.
At first, Henry attempted to resolve the matter within the existing religious and legal framework. But as the dispute dragged on, his frustration increasingly centred on something more fundamental than the validity of his marriage. Why should an authority in Rome have the final say over the affairs of an English king?
This is where Thomas Cromwell enters the story.
Unlike many of the aristocrats surrounding Henry, Cromwell had spent part of his earlier life in the worlds of commerce and law. He understood the practical realities of contracts, merchants and financial transactions, but he also recognised what could be achieved through Parliament.
During the 1530s, he played a key role in the legislation that transformed England’s relationship with Rome. In 1533, the Act in Restraint of Appeals asserted England’s authority to determine certain legal and ecclesiastical matters without referring them to the Pope. The following year, the Act of Supremacy recognised Henry as the supreme head of the Church of England.
The consequences reached far beyond the king’s marriage. Monasteries were dissolved, religious wealth and property changed hands, and those who refused to accept the new order could face severe punishment. Thomas More and Bishop John Fisher were executed in 1535 after refusing to accept Henry’s supremacy.
Yet one complication is worth remembering. Henry had not suddenly abandoned the religious beliefs he had previously defended. Even after breaking with Rome, he retained many traditional Catholic doctrines.
What had changed was not necessarily his understanding of right and wrong, but where the authority to decide lay. Once that authority shifted, other long-established rules could be reconsidered.
When Commerce Challenged Conscience
While Henry and Cromwell were transforming England’s religious institutions, another, less dramatic struggle was unfolding among the merchants whose trade helped sustain the kingdom.
Sixteenth-century international commerce was already surprisingly sophisticated. English merchants sold cloth abroad, purchased goods from continental markets and used bills of exchange to settle payments between distant cities. These arrangements avoided the dangers and inconvenience of transporting large quantities of coin, but they also enabled credit to circulate through commercial networks.
That created difficulties for anyone trying to distinguish legitimate trade from prohibited usury. A bill of exchange might represent a genuine currency transaction, but financial returns could also be concealed within exchange rates and payment arrangements.
The Crown attempted to regulate foreign exchange, yet merchants complained that restrictions were making ordinary business increasingly difficult. Among those who challenged the controls was Sir Richard Gresham, a prominent London merchant who warned Cromwell that they were damaging England’s cloth trade. In 1538, the government relaxed the restrictions.
I find this episode fascinating because it reveals something that is easily lost when we look back at history. Rules that appear perfectly sensible to those who make them can create problems for the people who must operate within them. And those people rarely remain passive. They adapt, find alternatives or attempt to persuade those in authority to change the rules.
The foreign-exchange dispute was not the same as the later reform of usury law, and we cannot establish that Cromwell personally devised the legislation passed in 1545. He was executed in 1540, five years before it became law.
But the episode shows that England’s government was already wrestling with the tension between financial restrictions and commercial activity. Henry did not suddenly discover how to regulate money and credit in 1545.
By then, however, the king had a much more immediate financial problem of his own.
A King Who Needed More Money
Henry’s military ambitions were proving extraordinarily expensive. In 1544, he had led a campaign into France, where his forces captured Boulogne. Taking the town was one thing; maintaining its defences, supplying its garrison and protecting it from French attempts to recover it were quite another.
Meanwhile, his alliance with Emperor Charles V had become less useful when Charles negotiated separately with France, leaving Henry in a difficult position. Fighting in Scotland added further demands, and in February 1545 an English army suffered a serious defeat at Ancrum Moor.
The costs were staggering. Historian Stanford Lehmberg estimates that Henry’s warfare may have been consuming around £700,000 a year — an extraordinary sum for the Tudor Crown.
Even the substantial wealth acquired through the dissolution of the monasteries could not indefinitely finance such ambitions. Henry needed more resources, and he was prepared to use the Crown’s authority to obtain them.
In January 1545, royal commissioners were instructed to raise what was called a benevolence. The word suggests a voluntary contribution, but the reality was rather less generous. Subjects were pressed to give money towards the king’s military campaigns, and refusal could have serious consequences.
One London alderman, Richard Read, refused to contribute and was sent to fight against the Scots on the king’s orders. The campaign ultimately raised an estimated £119,581.
I cannot help wondering how those being asked for money regarded the king’s wars. Did they see them as necessary for England’s security, or as costly adventures whose consequences they were being forced to bear?
The distinction matters because the Crown could determine what it considered a public necessity while also possessing the power to demand payment for it.
Henry borrowed money too, using merchant-financiers and established international credit networks. But another way to obtain resources did not require the same kind of direct appeal to taxpayers or lenders.
He could change the money itself.
When the King Changed the Money
During the 1540s, Henry’s government began what became known as the Great Debasement.
English coins derived much of their monetary credibility from the precious metals they contained. A silver coin had an official monetary value, but it also contained silver that could be weighed and valued.
By reducing the silver content of newly issued coins while maintaining their stated monetary values, the Crown could obtain additional spending power. A coin might still bear the king’s image and carry the same denomination, yet contain considerably less silver than an earlier coin.
From the government’s perspective, the attraction was obvious. It could issue more nominal money from the same quantity of precious metal and keep the difference as revenue.
But the effects did not stop at the royal treasury.
As people adjusted to coins containing less silver, prices and exchange relationships could change. Debasement contributed to inflation and monetary disruption, although other forces were also pushing prices up.
The policy continued under Edward VI after Henry’s death.
What strikes me is how similar this decision is to the wider changes taking place throughout Henry’s reign. The king had challenged Rome’s authority, his government had responded to merchants demanding relief from financial restrictions, and now the Crown was altering the currency on which everyone depended.
These were not necessarily parts of one carefully designed programme. They arose from different pressures and served different purposes. But each illustrates how those with the authority to change rules can alter the circumstances in which everyone else must live and make decisions.
The immediate benefits may be visible and politically attractive. The consequences, especially when they spread through an entire economy, can be much harder to anticipate.
Against this background, Parliament passed the legislation that first drew me into the history of usury.
The Law That Permitted What It Still Condemned
In 1545, Parliament passed a statute commonly known as the Act Against Usury.
Given its name, we might expect it to have strengthened the prohibition against charging interest. Instead, it established a legal ceiling of 10% per year on the return demanded for a loan.
Lending above that limit attracted statutory penalties, while lending within it escaped those particular penalties.
That sounds remarkably like a decision to legalise interest. But when I looked more closely at the statute, I discovered something unexpected.
Its preamble still described usury as “a Thing unlawful.”
The legislators also complained that earlier laws were obscure and had proved ineffective in securing punishment. They were not necessarily declaring that centuries of moral concern about usury had been mistaken. They appeared to be confronting the practical difficulty of regulating a financial activity that continued despite longstanding restrictions.
Rather than punishing every transaction involving a return on a loan, the law set a clearer boundary.
And that leaves us with a curious contradiction. How could something continue to be regarded as morally wrong while being legally tolerated, provided it remained within a prescribed limit?
Perhaps legislators believed that a rule people could understand and enforce would protect society more effectively than a prohibition routinely circumvented. That is not an unreasonable possibility, but it raises another question: what happens when a restriction intended to contain a practice begins to make that practice appear acceptable?
A lender who once faced moral and legal objections to demanding interest could now point to a statutory ceiling. A borrower might gradually come to regard the interest charged as simply the ordinary price of obtaining money. Over time, might a limit intended to restrain a practice begin to confer legitimacy upon it?
I am not suggesting that Henry’s legislation immediately transformed attitudes towards interest. Religious objections continued, and sophisticated credit arrangements had existed for centuries before his reign. Nor do we know precisely why the 1545 law took the form it did. The king’s financial difficulties, commercial pressures and changes in political authority all provide important context, but context is not proof of motive.
Nevertheless, I find the possibility that a rule can change what society regards as normal increasingly important.
A law may begin as a compromise between a moral principle and the practical difficulties of enforcing it. Yet the compromise can influence expectations, encourage new behaviour and gradually alter the environment in which future decisions are made.
And the consequences may extend far beyond anything its authors intended.
A Rule That Wouldn't Stay Changed
When I began revisiting Henry VIII’s usury legislation, I expected to find a king who had swept aside an important moral principle. Instead, I discovered a government trying to reconcile competing pressures. The objections to usury had not disappeared; merchants were already challenging financial restrictions, and the Crown was struggling to finance its ambitions. Parliament did not declare interest morally acceptable; instead, it set a legal limit while continuing to describe usury as unlawful.
Perhaps the legislators believed that a rule people could understand and enforce would achieve more than a prohibition they could not make work. I can see the appeal of that argument, especially when I remember how borrowing enabled me to start my own business. Yet I also wonder whether permitting a practice within prescribed limits can gradually change the way people think about it. A restriction originally intended to contain harm might, over time, help make the activity it regulates seem entirely normal.
We cannot assume that Henry’s legislation produced such a transformation. Attitudes towards lending had been evolving for centuries, and the moral debate continued long after his reign. But it has made me more conscious of something I had previously overlooked: rules do not simply prohibit or permit behaviour. They can influence expectations, alter incentives and change the possibilities available to those who must live within them.
I have also become more cautious about the connection I once drew between Henry’s marriage and his willingness to alter the usury laws. It is tempting to imagine a king who compromised his conscience over one issue and then found it easier to compromise over others. But I have not found sufficient evidence to establish that connection. The historical record shows more clearly a shift in the location of legal and religious authority, growing tensions between commercial practice and financial restrictions, and a Crown facing extraordinary financial demands.
The story is therefore neither simply one of a greedy king sweeping aside morality nor of enlightened commerce overcoming outdated religion. It is a story of people trying to govern economic behaviour while facing pressures and consequences they could not entirely control.
And just when I thought I was beginning to understand the significance of Henry’s decision, the history delivered another surprise.
Henry died in January 1547, little more than a year after the usury statute was passed. Five years later, during the reign of his son Edward VI, Parliament repealed the legislation and restored a much broader prohibition on lending at interest. What makes this particularly intriguing is that Edward’s government was more explicitly Protestant than Henry’s, so the familiar explanation that the Reformation simply swept away the old religious objections to usury does not fit the English sequence.
Then, in 1571, Elizabeth I’s Parliament changed the law again, returning to a system that permitted lending within a statutory ceiling.
Within little more than a quarter of a century, three monarchs had presided over three different approaches to the same problem. Each government had to decide how to balance moral concerns about exploitation with the practical realities of lending, yet none of these changes eliminated the underlying dilemma.
Perhaps the most interesting part of this story is not that Henry VIII changed the rules, but that the rules kept changing while the problem they were supposed to solve remained.
Why did successive governments reach such different conclusions? And what can their experience tell us about the consequences of trying to enforce a moral principle through legislation?
That’s where I want to take our investigation next.
Until next time, enthusiasts!
Victoria
Next time: When Prohibition Doesn’t Work.
Usury Laws
If you would like further context on my views on Henry VIII and his impact on usury Laws. Watch this talk I gave last year at the Mallorca Blockchain Conference.


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